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Abstract 
Britain has had particular problems reconciling itself to the idea of being a ‘European’ actor 
and a wholehearted member of the EEC/EU since 1973. Now, potentially, the ‘awkward 
partner’, is edging towards the exit door of the EU because a membership referendum is an 
increasingly likely prospect in the coming years. The aim of this special issue is to consider 
how we can account for the present state of affairs by adopting an interpretivist perspective 
on British European policy over the past four decades. The article begins with a 
comprehensive review of the extant literature on Britain and Europe, and an elaboration of 
the ‘traditions and dilemmas’ framework within which the contributors have studied the 
empirical material in their articles. It then explains the major themes that connect the articles 
and suggests how future research might build on the agenda proposed in this special issue.   
 




Introduction: Interpreting British European Policy 
  
 
‘If we leave the EU, we cannot of course leave Europe’ (Cameron, 2013). 
 
The UK formally acceded to the European Community (EC) when Prime Minister Edward 
Heath signed the Treaty of Rome on 1 January 1973, meaning that 1 January 2013 marked 
the fortieth anniversary of UK membership of what in 1993 became the European Union 
(EU). The question of whether or not Britain should ‘join Europe’ had been a growing source 
of consternation, contention and contestation within the Conservative and Labour parties 
throughout the period after the Second World War. It became most pronounced in the 1960s 
when the formal decision to apply was announced and ‘Europe’ was thrust to the centre stage 
of British politics. This was a decade of lofty rhetoric, false dawns and delicate diplomatic 
manoeuvring, as pro-European UK politicians struggled to persuade domestic and 
international audiences that the UK was ready to accept a European future. Two UK 
membership applications were vetoed by French President Charles de Gaulle, in 1963 and 
again in 1967. Throughout its period as applicant and member, UK politicians, diplomats and 
civil servants were involved in exhaustive negotiations aimed at fitting a large member state 
with global economic ties to the Commonwealth into institutional and economic 
arrangements carefully tailored to the necessities of creating a stable, long-term 
rapprochement between France and Germany (Wall, 2012). The sense that Britain ‘missed 
the bus’ and has forever been running to catch up has been pervasive (Young, 1998; the 
historiography surveyed in Daddow, 2004).  
Clearly, it is not only the British who struggle to relate to the EU, not least because 
the organization is a perpetual ‘moving target’. An experiment in regional governance 
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(Verdun, 2012), the EU is a complex, ‘inchoate’ (Ruttley, 2002, p. 229), unwieldy 
institutional design which struggles to keep pace with an expanding membership (now 28; 
Croatia was the latest member to join on 1 July 2013). A stark growth in policy competences 
since the 1990s and the crisis in the Eurozone since 2008 have added further layers of 
complexity to the ways in which publics and governments relate to the EU economically, 
politically and strategically, as doubts about the union’s future viability taint discussions 
about how to solve present problems (Taylor, 2008). Put simply, ‘the European Union 
continues to baffle observers and participants alike’ (Anderson, 2009, p. 79). That said, one 
of the themes of this special issue is that Britain has faced a peculiarly intractable set of 
problems when coming to terms with the idea of Europe and to the practices of the EU. It is 
not the fact of adapting to membership that has strained British credulity but the perceived 
magnitude of the adaptation that has been required for a former imperial power many of 
whose opinion formers have stubbornly ‘clung to the notion that their country still had a 
special place and mission in the world and that Empire should continue’ (Kennedy, 1985, p. 
332). By attempting in June 2014, unsuccessfully, to prevent Jean-Claude Juncker from 
becoming EU Commission President, David Cameron was the latest UK Prime Minister to 
‘stand alone’ in defence of an exceptionalist rendering of Britain’s role in Europe. 
Mainstream media once again reported on Britain losing another battle in a continuing ‘war’ 
against the threat of ‘federalism’ from Brussels. Yet another ‘behind closed doors’ 
agreement, the Eurosceptics proclaimed, had kept the EU on the wrong track, ‘not coming 
our way’ (Chapman 2014).  
Forty years on from accession, it is arguable that two issues left unaddressed in 1973 
have combined to give Britain a sense of semi-detachment from the EU during its years as an 
otherwise active member. First of all, it was far from clear how successfully the negotiated 
arrangements would work in practice, particularly on the economic side. Britain’s role as a 
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net contributor to the budget has been a persistent flashpoint in British-EU relations, 
particularly since the Margaret Thatcher-dominated feuds of the 1980s. Harold Wilson’s 
Labour government had immediately renegotiated the terms of entry in 1974-5, but this 
provided only ‘palliative measures which failed to correct the underlying problem’ (Wallace, 
2013, p. 541). EU budget disputes pitting ‘us’ against ‘them’ have become a regular fixture in 
the largely negative media coverage of the EU in Britain (for instance Barker, 2013). 
Secondly, at the level of national identity, no domestic consensus has formed around the idea 
of Britain being a truly engaged and leading player in the EU. The two-to-one vote by the UK 
public in favour of continued EC membership in the referendum of June 1975 has come 
under sustained assault as disputes over the current and future direction of the EU have 
permeated national political life in the UK. On top of inflammatory media stories (studied in 
de Vreese, 2007), weak leadership from Europhile politicians and an evident lack of public 
knowledge about (Usherwood, 2002, pp. 216-219), and empathy for, European governance 
structures across the Union (Daddow, 2011; Usherwood and Startin, 2013, p. 7) have 
combined to put Britain at the ‘sceptical’ end of public attitudes towards the organization 
when measured on a comparative basis. For example, an FT/Harris poll to mark the 50th 
anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 2007 found that 52% of Britons felt life 
had got worse since accession to the EC in 1973 (cited Vasilopoulou, 2013, p. 161). As with 
the Juncker debacle, David Cameron’s pledge that a Conservative-led government will hold a 
referendum on Britain’s membership of the EU in 2017 (Wintour et al, 2013) means that 
there has never been a more timely moment to analyze the material and ideational troubles 
Britain has encountered in ‘Europe’, because there is an increasing prospect that Britain may 
withdraw from the organization. It should also help draw out lessons for other member states 
seeking to confront a rising tide of Euroscepticism by plebiscitary vote.  
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This special issue was put together critically to reflect on the UK’s troubled encounter 
with ‘Europe’ at a momentous juncture in British-EU relations: the build-up to a possible 
2017 referendum on UK membership. It seems far from certain that a vote, should it occur, 
will go in favour of continued membership (Clark, 2011). Even should a referendum not take 
place, there is a continued sense of crisis underpinning the conduct of British-EU relations 
and it is important to appreciate how this situation has arisen and to ask how best we 
understand and explain continuity and change in UK-EU relations from 1973-2013. Our 
approach has been to assess British-European relations using a framework which draws on 
and develops an emerging interpretivist approach within the human sciences more generally 
(Bevir, 2002; Bevir, 2005). Still rather diffuse (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012), and 
according to some critics philosophically and methodologically problematic (Dowding, 2004; 
Glynos and Howarth, 2008; Smith, 2008; Jackson, 2011, p. 204;), we believe that an agent-
centred but not agent-only interpretivist perspective can offer something distinctive to the 
study of International Relations and national foreign policies (Bevir et al., 2014). To outline 
the nature of this contribution the goals of this introduction are threefold. First, we survey the 
existing literatures to which we speak and explain the framework the contributors worked to. 
Second, we give an overview of the arguments of each article and identify the most 
prominent narrative traditions which connect them. Finally, we sketch an empirical research 
agenda that will develop the insights garnered from the special issue.      
 
I. The European Issue in British Politics: An Interpretivist Perspective 
‘Britain’s relations with the movement towards creating a European Union or a United States 
of Europe provide examples both of genuine self-deception and of actual attempts to 
persuade the British people of things that the persuaders must have known were not true’ 
(Beloff, 1996, pp. 2-3). 
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This special issue investigates the complex webs of belief surrounding ‘Europe’ as a bone of 
contention in national political life in Britain by operating at the intersection of two 
complementary sets of literature. On the one hand, there is the work by political scientists on 
European integration and Euroscepticism treating Britain in comparative perspective. On the 
other, there is the detailed case study work from political history and IR on the evolution of 
British foreign policy, national identity and role in the world which takes ‘Europe’ as a prism 
through which to consider the contours of the debate between dominant and dissident visions 
of Britain’s global role. Having surveyed the relevant literature, this section explains the 
rationale for the interpretivist approach and how it has been enacted by contributors in the 




The first set of literature with which our work intersects is the ‘cottage industry’ that has 
sprung up around the study of Euroscepticism among elites, publics and, latterly, at grass 
roots level. This research has emerged largely but not exclusively (see Flood, 2002) in the 
institutional settings of Sussex in the UK, and North Carolina in the US (Mudde, 2011, p. 4; 
Vasilopoulou, 2013, p. 156) and ‘is now firmly established as a cross-disciplinary sub-field of 
European studies’ (Flood, 2009, p. 912). As the appearance of a 2012 special issue of the 
Journal of Common Market Studies devoted to Euroscepticism shows, Euroscepticism can no 
longer be ignored by EU leaders, policy-makers or scholars, and the study of Euroscepticism 
has become an ‘embedded and persistent phenomenon’ in the practice as well as the study of 
contemporary European politics (Usherwood and Startin, 2013). These research communities 
have inspired a rich array of comparative qualitative work and large-n, longitudinal studies 
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heavily steeped in the quantitative research tradition (landmark texts include Taggart, 1998; 
Ray, 1999). They generally seek to understand or map where Euroscepticism is and then to 
explain its emergence and appeal (Vasilopoulou, 2013), particularly but exclusively with 
reference to party systems and public opinion around the EU and candidate countries 
(Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2002; Guerra, 2013). The conceptual ground clearing and 
definitional work remain as significant to the enterprise today as at the beginning of the 
endeavour (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2013, pp. 18-19), with healthy debates still occurring 
over how to categorize different ‘strengths’ of Euroscepticism (‘hard’ versus ‘soft’), and 
about which typology best enables an accurate categorisation of party positions (see the 
critique of Taggart and Szczerbiak in Kopecký and Mudde, 2002). 
A major player in the EU and a Eurosceptical state par excellence (Spiering, 2004), 
Britain remains a compelling case for scholarly attention within these communities – yet it is 
treated as one case amongst many and this limits the qualitative depth of information that 
single case approaches can generate. The focus remains largely on how the push and pull of 
the British party system produces governing ‘preferences’ on integration on particular issues 
such as treaty change (Aspinwall, 2004). Smaller-n comparative work takes us some way to 
generating critical depth, particularly on the cultural context, national identity and discursive 
aspects of European integration dilemmas in domestic politics (for example Díez Medrano, 
2003). Single case research has the benefit of generating genuine qualitative depth whilst not 
ruling out the possibility of contributing to cross-case comparisons (Gerring, 2001, p. 215). 
Moreover, as Ben Rosamond has observed, country-focused research brings the normative 
and analytical benefit of breaking down supposed barriers between the ‘inside’ of states and 
the ‘outside’ of European integration, and so is well placed to reflect the governing reality of 
a ‘continuous and intimate interplay between the EU and national levels of authority’ 
(Rosamond, 2007, p. 240). In this collection we have endeavoured to achieve a more nuanced 
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understanding of the background beliefs that have informed what, historically speaking, the 
British have ‘made’ of ‘Europe’, and how these have fed through in European policy thinking 
in Downing Street and Whitehall (see also Gifford, 2008). Sensitivity to narrative traditions is 
important because we broadly agree with the now over a decade old finding of Marcussen et 
al. that ‘identity constructions and myths’ dating back centuries ‘are so embedded in the 
national political culture [in Britain] than not even dramatic geo-strategic developments 
trigger discursive contestation’ (Marcussen et al., 2001, p. 114). We seek to test the 
continuing applicability of this statement forty years after the supposedly momentous move 
of the British to secure a ‘European’ future.   
This special issue therefore looks to develop the findings of the Euroscepticism 
research programmes in two regards. First, we situate party debates in the context of wider 
national narratives – particularly on the economy and national sovereignty – which cross-cut 
party political boundaries and infiltrate the national ‘dialogue’ surrounding British identity 
and the merits of a long-term role in European integration. We do not disagree that elites are 
significant sources and transmitters of Euroscepticism, but we try to go beyond seeing the 
Eurosceptical linguistic repertoire only or mainly in its rationalist guise, as a strategic tool of 
party competition (Baker et al, 2002; Hooghe, 2007). We are interested in ideas, beliefs and 
narrative traditions in their ‘policy-shaping’ guise (Cini, 2006, p. 40), an essential but not 
deterministic component of the decisions which have ‘made’ British European policy as it is, 
variously, understood today.  
This focus cues our second motivation for the design of the special issue – it helps us 
rethink the problems surrounding the periodization of Euroscepticism (for instance Forster, 
2002) and how this affects the kind of knowledge we can and have discovered about British 
attitudes to Europe more generally (on periodization issues see Vasilopoulou, 2013, pp. 158-
163). We suggest that 1945 has too often been depicted as a convenient ‘origin’ or starting 
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point for investigating modern British attitudes to ‘Europe’ (good exceptions being Beloff, 
1996; Young, 2000). Convenient, certainly, but not altogether convincing, downplaying as it 
does the residue in the post-Second World War era of pre-1945 internal Whitehall debates 
about the merits of engaging ‘Europe’ (see Daddow in this collection), and the accompanying 
angst about Britain’s identity and role in the world that went with them (Schnapper, 2011; 
Crowson, 2011). With the 1993 Maastricht Treaty and the 2007 Lisbon Treaty regularly 
taken as vital turning points in the rise to popularity of Eurosceptical attitudes (Usherwood 
and Startin, 2013, pp. 3-4; Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2013, p. 17) across the EU and not just in 
Britain, it is important to reflect on how the potential importance of these critical junctures 
were perceived by the actors involved at the time, and how they made sense of them in the 
context of prior beliefs they had come to hold about Britain’s place in the wider European 
grouping, hence our focus on historically informed narrative traditions as background 
influences on policy decision-making.  
Through the interpretivist framework outlined below, the special issue speaks to a 
second category of literature on Britain and Europe. This interdisciplinary body of work – 
European Studies in empirical and methodological orientation, as opposed to contemporary 
‘EU Studies’ (McGowan  2008, p. 8; Warleigh-Lack, 2009) – looks to the historical, cultural 
and background ideas informing Britain’s policy responses to European integration 
dilemmas. This work takes various guises: British politics and/or foreign policy that have an 
explicit (Baker and Seawright, 1998; Deighton, 2001; Williams, 2005; Holden, 2011; 
Oppermann, 2012) or composite European focus (Turner, 2010; Gaskarth, 2013); the history 
of British diplomacy toward the EC/EU (George, 1994; Ludlow, 1997; Wilkes, 1997; Parr, 
2005; Gowland, Turner and Wright, 2010; Pine, 2012); political parties, civil society and 
other sectoral interests and European integration (Turner, 2000; Coupland, 2006; Crowson, 
2007; Usherwood, 2007; Broad and Daddow, 2010; Lynch, 2011; Fitzgibbon, 2013); and 
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accounts of the symbolism and cultural capital attached to Eurosceptical readings of the 
British (influentially Colley, 2005) – but most often English – national ‘character’ 
(Marcussen et al., pp. 111-114; Redwood, 2001, pp. 29-31; Paxman, 1999, pp. 24-42), 
particularly as expressed in media and other transmission devices (Anderson and Weymouth, 
1999; Spiering, 2004; Leconte, 2010; Daddow, 2012). In taking this approach we have 
actively responded to calls by a series of writers in recent years to expand the empirical basis 
and theoretical framework for our studies of Euroscepticism. Suggestively for our special 
issue, we find much to recommend the view that interdisciplinarity, or perhaps more 
accurately multidisciplinarity (Warleigh-Lack, 2009; Usherwood and Startin, 2013; 
Vasilopoulou, 2013), and the exploration of ‘resistances’ to European integration offer 
fruitful ways forward, especially in so far as appreciating ‘how the phenomenon is rooted and 
constructed within national political spaces’, within and well beyond political parties (Crespy 
and Vershueren, 2009, p. 382). Party political discourses feature prominently within the 
contributions in this special issue, but they do so as part of a wider inquiry into the heritage of 
Britain’s European travails over a much longer period than is acknowledged in the extant 
literature.  
 
Interpretivism as Social Ontology 
Interpretivists make a series of ontological and epistemological moves designed to cast fresh 
light on the ideational basis of political activity. Epistemologically, interpretivism shares 
affinities with, but is also distinctive from, constructivist and ‘post-ist’ approaches to the 
study of foreign policy and international relations (for instance Campbell, 1998; Epstein 
2008). Interpretivists agree that the world does not come to us unvarnished (Bevir and 
Rhodes, 1999), revealed as if peeling back a curtain to look through a clear window on a 
series of ‘given facts divorced from theoretical contexts’ (Finlayson, 2005b, p. 132). 
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Interpretivists do not deny either that there is a ‘world’ out there (they are epistemological 
sceptics not ontological nihilists), or that material power, institutions and discourses exist 
within that world (see for example the nuanced treatment of the dynamics of British foreign 
policy in Gaskarth 2013, especially pp.81-95). In the International Relations literature the 
latter are sometimes construed as ‘myths’ which shape foreign policy thinking (for instance 
Jones and Benvenuti, 2006, pp. 105-109). This anti- or postfoundational epistemology (Bevir, 
2011) is suggestive because it compels attention to the linguistic as well as the material 
dimensions of political life: ‘It understands politics itself as a kind of interpretive activity. 
Political movements develop a particular interpretation of the world and attempt to secure the 
victory of that interpretation over others so that it ceases to appear as an interpretation and 
looks to be the truth’ (Finlayson, 2005a, p. 154). In this special issue the contributors have 
tried to interpret the ‘sense’ individual British decision-makers and sometimes whole parties 
or factions thereof have come to hold about who the British are in identity terms, how these 
individuals and groups have ‘read’ British foreign policy interests, and how they have 
represented the EC/EU as object and outlet for the expression of these interests. Throughout, 
we have tried to recognize that both ‘Britain’ and ‘Europe’ are contested and evolving terms, 
sometimes maddeningly imprecise and always open to contestation – not least by today’s 
Eurosceptics (Pagden, 2002). Examining the dynamic interaction between these 
interconnected ‘layers’ of interpretation represents both methodological challenge and 
epistemological opportunity, so it is now necessary to unpack the precise nature of our 
intervention, centring on the notion of situated agency, traditions and dilemmas.  
The easiest way to distinguish interpretivism from constructivism and post-ist 
renderings of political action is to understand why and how interpretivists work the concept 
of situated agency, which in this special issue takes the form of an engagement with the 
notion of traditions and dilemmas. The key here is the recognition that: ‘Agency always 
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occurs against a particular historical background that influences it’ (Bevir et al., 2013, p. 
167). Interpretivists also appreciate that patterns of behaviour and language can be repeated 
into sometimes startlingly prominent patterns over time. Indeed, British European policy 
discourses have been found to exhibit just this tendency (Daddow, 2011). However, 
interpretivists differ from ‘thin’ constructivists who ‘add ideas and stir’ into an essentially 
materialist and/or institutionalist account of foreign policy activity. They also distinguish 
themselves from post-structuralists who treat the language or ‘discourses’ of foreign policy 
and national identity as structural constraints on political decision-making (Bevir et al., 2013, 
pp. 166-167), and from postmodernists who go to the other extreme by positing ‘a near 
infinite number of mutually exclusive subject positions or vantage points from which the 
world can be viewed differently’ (a useful distinction within the post-ist movement drawn by 
Hay, 2011, pp. 170-171; see also the critique in Glynos and Howarth, 2007).  
Situated agency is therefore used by intereptivists to engage the agency-structure 
problem in the analyzis of political action (Carlsnaes, 1992) by working the interplay 
between ‘context and conduct’ (Hay, 2011, p. 176). The interpretivist focus is mainly on 
agents, but they are treated empathetically and as far as possible on their own terms, as 
individuals or collections of humans who have the capacity to affect their environment, whilst 
recognizing that they are also products of the various contexts within which they act: socially, 
politically and ideationally. As B.A.S. Koene describes it (2006, p. 366): ‘institutional 
entrepreneurs have to operate from within an institutional context that already defines 
meaning and individual action and which, by definition, also affects the understanding and 
behaviour of the individual entrepreneur’. Ideational structures are no less real for being in 
the mind, yet as situated agents individuals or like-minded groups of individuals have the 
capacity to bring about change if they have the sufficient will, capacity and, importantly, if 
they can acquire constitutionally (for examples at elections) the formal or informal means to 
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build support for a particular position (Kabele, 2010). The way we approach British European 
policy in this special issue is to see it as the outcome of ideational and in some cases 
ideological contestation about British identity and the meaning those prior traditions give to 
policies that have been pursued toward the EC/EU.  
A tradition is ‘a set of understandings someone receives during socialization’, and 
comprises a dynamic relationship between beliefs and practices (Rhodes, 2007, p. 1250). A 
dilemma ‘arises for an individual or group when a new idea stands in opposition to existing 
beliefs or practices and so forces a reconsideration of the existing beliefs and associated 
tradition’ (Rhodes, 2007, p. 1253). Dilemmas bear the weight of causality in the interpretivist 
account of political change (Glynos and Howarth, 2008, pp. 158-159) because: ‘Traditions 
change as individuals make a series of variations to them in response to any number of 
specific dilemmas’ (Rhodes, 2007, p. 1253). Change for interpretivists occurs contingently 
(but not randomly – see Rosamond, 2007) ‘as people reinterpret, modify, or transform an 
inherited tradition in response to novel circumstances or other dilemmas’ (Bevir, 2010, p. 
427). Summing it up, Birgitte Poulsen explains that ‘it is through the occurrence of dilemmas 
that agency constantly transforms and reinvents existing traditions’ (Poulsen, 2008, p. 121; 
see also Hay, 2011, pp. 178-179; Wilkinson, 2011). All contributors to this special issue 
explored the usefulness of traditions to the study of British identities, British attitudes and 
policies towards the EC/EU. They investigated how past British thinkers and policy actors 
conceived of, extended, modified, and dismissed traditions of thought and/or how these 
traditions have influenced Britain’s policy and practice towards ‘Europe’. Key questions 
asked by the contributors are: What are the leading traditions of British national identity?  
How do they relate to other traditions of knowledge about British society, the state, and 
Britain’s place in the world? How did particular thinkers or groups (for example political 
parties) modify and renegotiate these traditions in response to novel circumstances and 
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dilemmas?  How have these traditions evolved over time? How did these traditions influence 
policy actors? What has been the relationship between thinking about British identity and 
Britain’s changing role in Europe? Having explained the literatures we intersect with and the 
interpretivist intervention we seek to make, this article now delineates the main themes 
running through the articles in the special issue. 
 
II. The Articles in this Special Issue 
The articles in this special issue are loosely grouped around two sets of issues. The first 
explores the background beliefs held by British elites and the public on the question of 
national identity, which together inform the particular brand of Euroscepticism found today 
in Britain. Piers Ludlow provides much needed historical background to contemporary 
debates by looking at the crucial six-day House of Commons debates on membership of the 
EEC in October 1971. He finds that Conservative and Labour politicians opposed to 
membership referred to a number of ‘British’ traditions such as free trade, the 
Commonwealth/internationalist tradition – which we will come back to below – and 
parliamentary democracy, which in their view clashed with the principles underlying 
European integration and therefore made it threatening to British identity and interests. These 
techniques for framing the Europe question in British political discussions are important in 
helping us understand how the debate about ‘Europe’ has unfolded during the membership 
years since 1973. 
Michael Kenny and Helen Brockelhurst both provide more contemporary general 
backgrounds to the Eurosceptic imaginary in Britain by focussing on attempts to redefine 
Britishness and Englishness in public debates and in the history curriculum for schools. Both 
articles show the extent to which this has tended to exclude European integration or at least 
make it problematic to identify positively with it. For Kenny, Euroscepticism has flowed 
 15 
from an increasingly ‘Anglo-centric’ conception of English identity, which rejects both 
Britishness at home and supranationalism abroad. In this perspective the recent success of 
UKIP, an insular and populist party with no roots outside England, is testimony to an 
entrenched unease with the European project among large sections of the English population. 
Kenny identifies several competing narratives of Englishness – a conservative romantic one 
trying to restore a unique England that pre-existed Britain and popularised by authors such as 
Roger Scruton, for whom national identity was threatened by participation in the European 
project; a radical-democratic one, represented by Tom Nairn, which identifies a void at the 
heart of English identity and a lack of a democratic English tradition, with ‘Europe’ presented 
as a possible remedy to the identity vacuum felt in England; finally a liberal ‘Anglo-Britain’ 
tradition following Michael Oakeshott, which continues to argue, unlike the previous two, 
that Britain as a democratic parliamentary system is a satisfactory entity with which the 
English can identify and that Europe is a successful opening to globalisation. Kenny’s own 
conclusion is that these different views possibly fail to take account of the fluid and 
contingent realities of Englishness. By investigating the construction of national history as 
reflected in school curricula, Helen Brocklehurst reaches similar conclusions in her article on 
the connections between history curricula and national state-building projects. Focussing on 
the ‘great debate’ about the teaching of British history in the 1980s Brocklehurst sees British 
state school history curricula being imbued with Conservative ideology during the Margaret 
Thatcher years. She tracks how the essence of this curriculum survived the shift from 
Conservative to New Labour government in the 1990s and 2000s, and finally reflects on 
Michael Gove’s push for more national history to be taught in schools under the Coalition 
government since 2010.   
Oliver Daddow’s article goes further in this direction by examining the evolution of 
the ‘outsider’ tradition in the articulation of British foreign policy after the Second World 
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War. By drawing on its historical lineage as an outside balancer in Europe, elites represented 
Britain as ‘exceptional’, linked to the continent but not ‘of it’, as Winston Churchill put it. 
British power in this widespread view came from it being a global actor, materially and 
ideationally. Its engagement in Europe was part of a ‘limited liability’ strategy, a necessary 
evil which could never prove as fulfilling as its ‘special relationship’ with the US and its 
continued leadership of the Commonwealth. This tradition remains the starting point of many 
contemporary narratives about British European policy. It has taken several forms since the 
19th century, with Britain playing different roles in time in Europe – first a balancer but with 
clear tendencies towards keeping out of continental European affairs unless pushed after the 
1860s (1815-1939), then a supporter (1939-55), a saboteur (1955-56), a rival (1956-60), a 
supplicant (1960-73) and finally an insider (since 1973). Continuing debates and divisions 
about membership of the EC/EU as well as the return of a debate on withdrawal are evidence 
that the last phase marked an inflection rather than a disavowal of the ousider tradition - 
indeed Daddow finds numerous references to previous outsider periods in Prime Ministers’ 
rhetoric since the later Margaret Thatcher years, especially through their continued stress on 
the need for Europe to ‘reform’. 
This first set of articles alights on two main narrative traditions framing many 
political actors’ negative perceptions of Europe, which the second set of articles develops – a 
technocratic/modernist one and a Commonwealth/empire tradition. The 
technocratic/modernist tradition focuses on the economic consequences of EU membership. 
It does not necessarily lead to Eurosceptic views, as the example of New Labour showed. 
While globalisation was at the core of its analyzis of Britain’s place in the world, key New 
Labour people concluded, in what David Baker et al. called an ‘open regionalist’ view, that 
engagement with Europe could be an important step to making the most of life in a globalized 
world (2002a). Similarly, as noted by Craig Parsons and Cary Fontana, some pro-European 
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figures in the Conservative party in the 1980s and 1990s connected neoliberalism and 
technocratic cosmopolitanism, fitting them with the European project. Reference to the 
technocratic/modernist tradition is now to be found mostly within the Conservative party and 
in the rhetoric of UKIP. Drawing on the classical economic tradition as well as a more recent 
Thatcherite neo-liberal thought, it portrays Britain’s economic prosperity as based on its 
openness to free trade and liberalism and sees the EU as an obstacle to Britain’s fully 
enjoying the fruits of globalisation by restricting access to global markets and imposing 
regulations which limit the competitiveness of European companies. This view, described by 
Baker et al. as ‘hyperglobalist’, now informs the attitudes of many Conservatives, justifying 
the demands of some for withdrawal from the EU (2002a). It was not always the case, as 
Parsons and Fontana remind us, because in the early 1960s the benefits of trading with its 
neighbours justified, in the view of many Conservatives, joining the EC, not leaving it. 
In their article, Parsons and Fontana advance the interpretivist agenda by reflecting on 
the diverse ways in which elite actors remain ‘situated agents’. In their analyzis of 
Conservative Euroscepticism they point to the key role played by Margaret Thatcher, both as 
Prime Minister and after her downfall, as a catalyzt for the radicalisation of party positions 
towards Europe. She combined a strong belief in neoliberalism with equally strong nationalist 
instincts and attachment to sovereignty, a seeming contradiction which Euroscepticism 
solved. They argue that with EEC/EU enlargement and a liberal European Commission in 
Brussels, the Conservative Party could have become more comfortable with the EU after she 
left power. It took Thatcher’s influence and a number of contingent events, including the 
Danish ‘no’ vote on the Maastricht treaty in 1992, for a Eurosceptic discourse to take 
intellectual hold of a group of MPs and then spread throughout the party as a whole. 
In his article on the dilemmas of contemporary British conservatism, Mark Vail points 
to the paradox that the neoliberal populist euroscepticism embodied by David Cameron was 
 18 
pursued in parallel with the monetarist and austerity-led policies of the German government 
and the European Central Bank. In other words, technocratic neoliberalism à la Cameron has 
converged with German policy at the same time as he has been distancing Britain from 
Europe. To him this is the result of unresolved tensions between two Conservative traditions, 
neoliberalism and One-nation Toryism. The Prime Minister‘s popular and populist 
Euroscepticism, in this vision, concealed the extent of the divisive spending cuts programme 
at home, a result of neoliberal ideology which clearly broke with the One-nation tradition. 
The second tradition on which contemporary British Euroscepticism draws is a 
sentimental vision of the Commonwealth. It is grounded not only in the history of the close 
links between the UK and its former colonies but also in the idea that they still share a 
number of institutions, common law and values which set their relation apart from, and 
above, those enjoyed with other countries, especially in Europe. It was mostly used in the 
political debate in the 1960s and 1970s but has made a surprising comeback, under different 
guises, since the early 2000s. One aspect has been the reference among Conservative 
eurosceptics to an “Anglosphere” with former dominions and the US, which is seen as 
offering a possible alternative to European integration. Ben Wellings and Helen Baxendale 
show in their article that the Anglosphere model appeals to a British national narrative of the 
‘open sea’ tradition, while providing the possibility of a future for Britain outside the EU. 
Suddenly the past is no longer only the past but offers hope for a better future. Conservative 
MP John Redwood, MEP Daniel Hannan, Boris Johnson, the Mayor of London and 
Conservative MP Bill Cash, who chairs the European Scrutiny Committee in the House of 
Commons, are among the most articulate proponents of such a calling, but echoes of it can be 
found in the rhetoric of David Cameron and William Hague, who have been keen to promote 
links with Commonwealth countries since 2010. The open sea tradition is related to the 
neoliberal tradition via a focus on free trade and globalisation. However, it adds a resonant 
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historical, institutional and emotional dimension to it through evocation of imperial grandeur 
and global familial connections. 
The case of UKIP is interesting in that it draws from both of the technocratic and 
Commonwealth traditions. Karine Tournier-Sol shows the extent to which UKIP identifies 
the EU as undemocratic and argues that Britain has a different history, which echoes the 
Commonwealth tradition. Nigel Farage indeed defines his party as ‘the Party of the 
Commonwealth’. At the same time he articulates a Conservative and populist view of Britain 
as a global, not a regional power which can prosper outside the EU by ridding itself of costly 
regulations and promoting free trade with third countries, especially in the Commonwealth.  
Finally, Pauline Schnapper examines the dilemmas faced by the Labour party under 
Gordon Brown and Ed Miliband. She argues that, unlike Tony Blair, they have resorted to a 
cautious pro-Europeanism, qualified by many criticisms of the way the EU works, which is 
reminiscent of Hugh Gaitskell and Harold Wilson in the 1960s. Like them, Brown and 
Miliband insisted on the shortcomings of the EU with reference less, as with their 
Conservative counterparts, to the Commonwealth tradition, but instead to the broader notion 
of British exceptionalism. In this rendering, Britain’s destiny is to be multilateralist, a bridge 
between Europe and America and an open free trading nation. This suggests a strong 
continuity with Gaitskell and Wilson’s internationalism and attachment to the 
Commonwealth. As a result, membership of the EU is of benefit to the UK, provided it 
remains mostly intergovernmentalist and ‘reforms’ itself – an ubiquitous term in 
contemporary Labour discourse, meant to apply to the euro crisis, unemployment in Europe, 
the budget and many other sectors – resulting in a return to a Labour soft Euroscepticism 
redolent of the 1960s. 
 
III. Future research 
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The interpretivist framework set out in this special issue offers possible channels for future 
research: more on the British case study itself, and the broader comparative perspective, 
which would compare and contrast British narrative traditions about Europe with those of 
other countries in and outside the EU. First, the contributions in the special issue have 
generally sought to outline what has broadly been construed as a ‘Eurosceptical’ tradition of 
thought about Britain’s relations with Europe. The authors have agreed that this tradition 
draws on an historically constituted ‘outsider’ tradition which has popularised among the 
British public and elites the idea that a whole-hearted continental commitment is something 
to embraced at best cautiously or at worst shunned altogether. The post-1980s ‘Eurosceptical’ 
adaptation of this tradition saw situated agents across the main political parties gain traction 
from this narrative by adding to it a series of concerns about the direction of European 
integration on economic, strategic, sovereignty and identity grounds. 
What the special issue was less able to cast light upon was the power dynamics 
between the Eurosceptical tradition and rival, pro-European narratives, which have been the 
preserve of the liberal broadsheet press, in the Liberal Democrat Party itself, and among a 
dwindling band of openly Europhile politicians in the Labour and Conservative parties.  The 
undoubted popularity of the liberal-minded ‘missed opportunity’ interpretation of British 
European policy often belied its impact on Britain’s European policy thinking, even under 
notionally Europhile UK governments (Liddle, 2014). Its fate under the Coalition 
government since 2010 seems to have been all but sealed by two developments. One has been 
the crisis in the Eurozone which has undermined the strength of an economic case for a 
proactive European policy. The other has been the continued resonance of popular and 
political Euroscepticism within the Conservative Party, UKIP and large sections of the media, 
and a lack of confidence among Liberal Democrat members of the government of 
parliamentary party to speak up on an issue that has the potential to prove extremely divisive 
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within the coalition as a whole. It seems probable therefore, that Britain’s national debate 
about Europe will continue to draw on the Commonwealth/open seas or the 
technocratic/liberal narrative traditions identified in this special issue. Should Britain 
eventually hold a referendum on EU membership, this would obviously be a good place to 
begin the search for rival narratives, and to study their lineage back through the historical 
debates about Britain’s role in Europe and the wider world. 
Another fruitful line for future research would be to study the diverse ways in which 
nations in and outside the EU have related to the organisation on the back of the collective 
beliefs about the meaning of ‘Europe’ in domestic political and cultural life, national identity 
questions, and their preferred role in the world. This comparative work could certainly be 
effected using the traditions and dilemmas framework in this special issue. Excellent work in 
this area has previously been carried out to by Vivien Schmidt who follows an discursive 
institutionalist approach  (Schmidt, 2001 and 2008) and by Marcussen et al in a constructivist 
vein (1999). However, the tradition and dilemmas approach provides other opportunities for 
future comparative analyzis, looking not just at national narratives but also how agents have 
adjusted them to new dilemmas. Debates about the future of the EU, the Eurozone and the so-
called ‘democratic deficit’ across the EU would provide interesting case-studies in that 
respect. What a study of other countries would help us cast much needed light on is the nature 
of the narratives that sustain the exceptionalist rendering all national identity constructions, 
even as they come together to pool sovereignty in a collective integrative endeavour aimed at 
solving shared problems that are no longer felt adequately to be addressed by states acting 
independently. The British have had particular problems adapting to the challenges that 
engaging in a collective European endeavour have posed to much cherished historical sense 
of ‘Britain’ as international actor. An interesting task is now to discover how far the British 
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have been alone in this, or what it has been about the European project itself that has come to 
prove so divisive to so many in such a relatively short space of time.   
   
References 
Anderson, P. (2009) The New Old World (London: Verso). 
Anderson, P.J. and Weymouth, A. (1999) Insulting the Public? The British Press and the 
European Union (London: Longman). 
Aspinwall, M. (2004) Rethinking Britain and Europe: Plurality Elections, Party Management 
and British Policy on European Integration (Manchester: Manchester University Press). 
Baker, D. and Seawright, D. (eds) (1998) Britain For and Against Europe: British Politics 
and the Question of European Integration (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 
Baker, D. Gamble, A., Randall, N. and Seawright, D. (2002) ‘Euroscepticism in the British 
Party System: “A Source of Fascination, Perplexity, and Sometimes Frustration”.’ In 
Szczerbiak, A. and Paul Taggart, P. (eds) Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics 
of Euroscepticism, Volume One: Case Studies and Country Surveys (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press), pp.93-116. 
Baker, D., Gamble, A. and Seawright, D. (2002a), ‘Sovereign Nations and Global Markets: 
Modern British Conservatism and Hyperglobalism’, British Journal of Politics and International 
Relations, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 399-428. 
Barker, A. (2013) ‘David Cameron decries EU budget “ambushes” at summits’, Financial 
Times, 28 June. Available at: <<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/33bf2738-e002-11e2-9de6-
00144feab7de.html#axzz2kifzFuI0>>. 
 23 
Beloff, Lord (1996) Britain and European Union: Dialogue of the Deaf (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan). 
Bevir, M. (2005) New Labour: A Critique (Abingdon: Routledge). 
Bevir, M. (2002) The Logic of the History of Ideas (Canbridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Bevir, M. (2011) ‘Political Science After Foucault’, History of the Human Sciences, Vol. 24, 
No. 4, pp. 81-96. 
Bevir, M. and Rhodes, R. (1999) ‘Studying British Government: Reconstructing the Research 
Agenda’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 215-239. 
Bevir, M. and Rhodes, R. (2007) Governance Stories (London: Routledge). 
Bevir, M., Daddow, O. and Hall, I. (2013) ‘Introduction: Interpreting British Foreign Policy’, 
British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 163-174. 
Bevir, M., Daddow, O. and Hall, I. (2014) Interpreting Global Security (Abingdon: 
Routledge). 
Broad, M. and Daddow, O. (2010) ‘Half Remembered Quotations from Mostly Forgotten 
Speeches: The Limits of Labour’s European Policy Discourse’, British Journal of Politics 
and International Relations, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp.205-222. 
Campbell, D. (1998) Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of 
Identity (revised edition) (Minneapolis, MN.: University of Minnesota Press). 
Carlsnaes, W. (1992) ‘The Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analyzis’, 
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 3, pp. 245-70. 
 24 
Chapman, J. (2014) ‘Loser Cameron branded the “Rooney of Europe”: PM warns Britain is 
in a “war” with EU after leaders railroad through appointment of arch-federalist Juncker’, 
Daily Mail, 27 June. Available at: << http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2671985/Angry-Cameron-warns-European-leaders-consequences-Cognac-breakfast-
Brussels-fixer-Jean-Claude-Juncker-given-EUs-job.html>>.   
Cini, M. (2006) ‘The “State of the Art” in EU Studies: From Politics to Interdisciplinarity 
(and Back Again?)’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 38-46. 
Clark, T. (2011) ‘EU referendum: poll shows 49% would vote for withdrawal’, Guardian, 24 
October. Available at: << http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/24/eu-referendum-
poll-uk-withdrawal?guni=Article:in%20body%20link>>. 
Colley, L. (2005) Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837 (Yale: Yale University Press). 
Coupland, P.M. (2006) Britannia, Europa and Christendom: British Christians and 
European Integration (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). 
Crespy, A. and Vershueren, N. (2009) ‘From Euroscepticism to Resistance to European 
Integration: An Interdisciplinary Perspective’, Perspectives on European Politics and 
Society, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 377-393.  
Crowson, N.J. (2007) The Conservative Party and European Integration since 1945: At the 
Heart of Europe? (London: Routledge). 
Crowson, N.J. (2011) Britain and Europe: A Political History since 1918 (Abingdon: 
Routledge). 
Daddow, O.J. (2004) Britain and Europe since 1945: Historiographical Perspectives on 
Integration (Manchester: Manchester University Press). 
 25 
Daddow, O. (2011) New Labour and the European Union: Blair and Brown’s Logic of 
History (Manchester: Manchester University Press). 
Daddow, O. (2012) ‘The UK Media and “Europe”: From Permissive Consensus to 
Destructive Dissent’, International Affairs, 88, 6, pp.1219-1236. 
De Vreese, C. (2007) ‘A Spiral of Euroscepticism: The Media’s Fault?’, Acta Politica, Vol. 
42, No. 2/3, pp. 271-286. 
Deighton, A. (2001) ‘European Union Policy.’ In Seldon, A. (ed.) The Blair Effect: The Blair 
Government 1997-2001 (London: Little, Brown and Company), pp. 307-328. 
Díez Medrano, J. (2003) Framing Europe: Attitudes to European Integration in Germany, 
Spain, and the United Kingdom (Oxford: Princeton University Press). 
Dowding, K. (2004) ‘Interpretation, Truth and Investigation: Comments on Bevir and 
Rhodes’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 136-142. 
Epstein, C. (2008) The Power of Words in International Relations: Birth of an Anti-Whaling 
Discourse (London: MIT Press). 
Finlayson, A. (2005a) ‘Meaning and Politics: Assessing Bevir and Rhodes’, British Journal 
of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 149-156. 
Finlayson, A. (2005b) ‘The Interpretive Approach in Political Science: A Symposium – 
Introduction’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 129-
136.  
Fitzgibbon, J. (2013) ‘Citizens Against Europe? Civil Society and Eurosceptic Protest in 
Ireland, the United Kingdom and Denmark’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 51, 
No. 1, pp. 105-121. 
 26 
Flood, C. (2002) ‘The Challenge of Euroscepticism.’ In Gower, J. (ed.) The European Union 
Handbook (2nd edition) (London: Fitzroy Dearborn). 
Flood, C. (2009) ‘Dimensions of Euroscepticism’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 
47, No. 4, pp. 911-917. 
Forster, Anthony (2002) Euroscepticism in contemporary British politics: opposition to 
Europe in the British Conservative and Labour parties since 1945 (London: Routledge). 
Gaskarth, J. (2013) British Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Polity). 
George, S. (1994) An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community (2nd edition) 
(New York: Oxford University Press. 
Gerring, J. (2001) Social Science Methodology: a Criterial Framework (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press). 
Gifford, C. (2008) The Making of Eurosceptic Britain: Identity and Economy in a Post-
Imperial State (Aldershot: Ashgate). 
Glynos, J. and Howarth, D. (2008) ‘Structure, Agency and Power in Political Analyzis: 
Beyond Contextualised Self-Interpretations’, Political Studies Review, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 155-
169. 
Gowland, D., Turner, A. and Wright, A. (2010) Britain and European integration since 1945: 
on the sidelines (London: Routledge). 
Guerra, S. (2013) Central and Eastern European Attitudes in the Face of the Union 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). 
Hay, C. (2011) ‘Interpreting Interpretivism Interpreting Interpretations: The New 
Hermeneutics of Public Administration’, Public Administration, Vol. 89, No. 1, pp. 167-182. 
 27 
Holden, P. (2011) ‘Still “Leading from the Edge”? New Labour and the European Union.’ In 
Daddow, O. and Gaskarth, J. (eds) British Foreign Policy: The New Labour Years 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave), pp. 157-169. 
Hooghe, L. (2007) ‘What Drives Euroskepticism?: Party-Public Cueing, Ideology and 
Strategic Opportunity’, European Union Politics, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 5-12. 
Jackson, P.T. (2011) The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of 
Science and its Implications for the Study of World Politics (London: Routledge). 
Jones, D.M. and Benvenuti, A. (2006) ‘Tradition, Myth and the Dilemma of Australian 
Foreign Policy’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 60, No. 1, pp. 103-124. 
Kabele, J. (2010) ‘The Agency/Structure Dilemma: A Coordination Solution’, Journal for the 
Theory of Social Behaviour, Vol. 40, No. 3, pp. 314-338. 
Kennedy, P. (1985) The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British 
External Policy 1865-1980 (London: Fontana Press). 
Koene, B.A.S. (2006) ‘Situated Human Agency, Institutional Entrepeneurship and 
Institutional Change’, Journal of Organizational Change, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 365-382. 
Kopecký, P. and Mudde, C. (2002) ‘The Two Sides of Euroscepticism: Party Positions on 
European Integration in East Central Europe’, European Union Politics, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 
297-326. 
Leconte, C. (2010) Understanding Euroscepticism (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 
Liddle, R. (2014) Britain’s European Dilemma: Britain and the Drama of EU Integration 
(London: I.B. Tauris). 
 28 
Ludlow, N.P. (1997) Dealing with Britain: The Six and the First UK Application to the EEC 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Lynch, P. (2011) ‘The Con-Lib Agenda for Europe.’ In Lee, S. and Beech, M. (eds) The 
Cameron-Clegg Government: British Politics in an Age of Austerity (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan), pp. 218-233. 
Marcussen, M. et al. (1999), “Constructing Europe ? The evolution of French, British and 
German nation state identities”, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 614-
633. 
Marcussen, M., et al. (2001) ‘Constructing Europe? The Evolution of Nation-State Identities.’ 
In Christiansen, T., Jørgensen, K.E. and Wiener, A. (eds) The Social Construction of Europe 
(London: SAGE), pp. 101-120. 
McGowan, F. (2008) ‘The Contrasting Fortunes of European Studies and EU Studies: 
Grounds for Reconciliation?’. SEI Working Paper, No. 99. 
Mudde, C. (2011) ‘Sussex v. North Carolina: The Comparative Study of Party Based 
Euroscepticism’, EPERN Working Paper, No. 23 (August). 
Oppermann, K. (2012) British Foreign and Security Policy: Historical Legacies and Current 
Challenges (Augsburg: Wissner-Verlag). 
Pagden, A. (2002) ‘Introduction.’ In Pagden, A. (ed.) The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to 
the European Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 1-32. 
Parr, H. (2005) Britain’s Policy Towards the European Community: Harold Wilson and 
Britain’s World Role, 1964-1967 (London: Routledge).  
Paxman, J. (1999) The English: A Portrait of a People (London: Penguin). 
 29 
Pine, M. (2012) Harold Wilson and Europe: Pursuing British Membership of the European 
Community (London: I.B. Tauris). 
Poulsen, B. (2009) ‘Competing Traditions of Governance and Dilemmas of Administrative 
Accountability: The Case of Denmark’, Public Administration, Vol. 87, No. 1, pp.117-31. 
Ray, L. (1999) ‘Measuring Party Orientation Towards European Integration: Results from an 
Expert Study’, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 283-306. 
Redwood, J. (2001) Stars and Strife: The Coming Conflicts Between the USA and the 
European Union (Basingstoke: Palgrave). 
Rhodes, R.A.W. (2007) ‘Understanding Governance: Ten Years On’, Organization Studies, 
Vol. 28, No. 8, pp. 1243-1264 
Rosamond, B. (2007) ‘European Integration and the Social Science of EU Studies: The 
Disciplinary Politics of a Subfield’, International Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 2, pp. 231-252. 
Ruttley, P. (2002) ‘The Long Road to Unity: The Contribution of Law to the Process of 
European Integration since 1945.’ In Pagden, A. (ed.) The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to 
the European Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 228-259. 
Schmidt, V. (2001), “The Politics of Economic Adjustment in France and Britain: when does 
discourse matter ?”, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 247-264. 
Schmidt, V. (2008), “Délibération publique et discours de légitimation en France et en 
Grande-Bretagne face à l’intégration européenne”, Revue Internationale de Politique 
Comparée, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 555-571. 
Schnapper, P. (2011) British Political Parties and National Identity: A Changing Discourse 
1997-2010 (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing). 
 30 
Schwartz-Shea, P. and Yanow, D. (2012) Interpretive Research Design: Concepts and 
Processes (London: Routledge). 
Smith, M.J. (2008) ‘Re-Centring British Government: Beliefs, Traditions and Dilemmas in 
Political Science’, Political Studies Review, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 143-154. 
Spiering, M. (2004) ‘British Eurosceptcism.’ In Harmsen, R. and Spiering, M. (eds) 
Euroscepticism: Party Politics, National Identity and European Integration (Amsterdam: 
Rodopi), pp. 127-149. 
Taggart, P. (1998) ‘A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary West 
European Party Systems’, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 33, No. 3, pp. 363-
388. 
Taggart, P. and Szczerbiak, A. (2001) ‘Parties, Positions and Europe: Euroscepticism in the 
EU Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe’, OERN Working Paper, No. 2.   
Taggart, P. and Szczerbiak, A. (2013) ‘Coming in from the Cold? Euroscepticism, 
Government Participation and Party Positions on Europe’, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, Vol. 51, No. 1, pp. 17-37. 
Taylor, P. (2008) The End of European Integration? Anti-Europeanism Examined 
(Abingdon: Routledge). 
Turner, J. (2000) The Tories and Europe (Manchester: Manchester University Press). 
Turner, M.J. (2010) Britain and the world in the twentieth century: ever decreasing circles 
(London: Continuum UK). 
Usherwood, S. (2002) ‘Opposition to the European Union in the UK: The Dilemma of Public 
Opinion and Party Management’, Government and Opposition, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 211-230. 
 31 
Usherwood, S. (2007) ‘Proximate Factors in the Mobilization of Anti-EU Groups in France 
and the UK: The European Union as First Order Politics’, Journal of European Integration, 
Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 3-21. 
Usherwood, S. and Startin, N. (2013) ‘Euroscepticism as a Persistent Phenomenon’, Journal 
of Common Market Studies, Vol. 51, No. 1, pp. 1-16. 
Vasilopoulou, S. (2013) ‘Continuity and Change in the Study of Euroscepticism: Plus ça 
Change?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 51, No. 1, pp. 153-168. 
Verdun, A. (2012) ‘Experimentalist Governance in the European Union: A Commentary’, 
Regulation and Governance, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 385-393.  
Wall, S. (2012) The Official History of Britain and the European Community, Vol.II: From 
Rejection to Referendum, 1963-1975 (London: Routledge). 
Wallace, H. (2013) ‘The UK: 40 Years of EU Membership’, Journal of Contemporary 
European Research, Vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 531-546.  
Warleigh-Lack, A. (2009) ‘Interdisciplinarity in Research on the EU: Politics, History and 
Prospects for Collaboration.’ In Kaiser, W., Leucht, B., and Rasmussen, M. (eds) The History 
of the European Union; Origins of a Trans- and Supranational Policy 1950-72 (London: 
Routledge), pp. 206-220. 
Wilkes, G. (1997) Britain’s Failure to Enter the European Community 1961-63: The 
Enlargement Negotiations and Crises in European, Atlantic and Commonwealth Relations 
(London: Frank Cass). 
Wilkinson, K. (2011) ‘Organised Chaos: An Interpretive Approach to Evidence-based Policy 
Making in Defra’, Political Studies, Vol. 59, No. 4, pp.959-977 
 32 
Williams, P.D. (2005) British Foreign Policy Under New Labour, 1997-2005 (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan). 
Wintour, P., Watt, N. and Clark, T. (2012) ‘Nick Clegg’s warning to David Cameron: Britain 
must stay in Europe’, Guardian, 26 December. Available at 
<<http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2012/dec/26/clegg-warning-cameron-britain-
europe>>.   
Young, H. (1998) This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair (London: 
Macmillan). 
Young, J.W. (2000) Britain and European Unity 1945-1999, (2nd edition) (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan). 
 
